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CRIMVINAL DISCOVERY: WHAT TRUTH DO WE SEEK?
Milton C. Lee, Jr.*
"Criminal discovery is not a game. It is integral to the quest for truth and
the fair adjudication of guilt or innocence."'
INTRODUCTION

Deputy Clerk:

Calling a matter appearing on the trial calendar, United States
v. Gerald Dark. Are the parties ready for trial?
Government: The government is ready for trial.
Defense:
The defense is also ready for trial.
Judge:
We now have a jury panel in the courtroom. Would the
government like to introduce its witnesses?
Government: The government has twelve witnesses to introduce in person
and four through identifying information.
As the government introduces its witnesses, the following confidential exchange
takes place between the defendant and his counsel.
Defense:
Mr. Dark, you have got to tell me who are all of these
witnesses that the government is bringing in here? Do you
know any of these people, or, more importantly, what they are
going to say about your involvement in this matter?
Mr. Dark:
You're the lawyer, why don't you know? Can you get a
continuance?
The above exchange actually occurred during the Spring of 1988 in a murder
case in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Because of this all-toofrequent experience, I became interested in the disparity between the discovery
made available to a criminal defendant and that which is enjoyed by litigants in
the civil arena. For almost ten years as a member of the Public Defender Service
in the District of Columbia, I represented countless indigent clients charged with
criminal offenses. In many of those cases, my indigent clients were charged with
offenses that exposed them to a potential sentence of life in prison. In almost all
* The author recently received an appointment to the bench of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia as a Hearing Commissioner, and thus he "retired" from trying cases. From 1984 to
1993, he was an attorney at the District of Columbia Public Defender Service (PDS). serving for two

years as the deputy trial chief. For four years, he was a professor at the University of the District of
Columbia School of Law. The author thanks the many people who provided assistance as he wrote
this article. Musa Eubanks is the law clerk to the author. He is a graduate of the George Vashington
University School of Law and upon graduation clerked for the Honorable Susan P_ Winfield, Assoct.
ate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The author thanks him for his contributions to this article, especially to the historical development section.
1 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 419 (1988) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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of those cases, I went to trial without the government's having ever been required
to disclose either the identity or statements of the witnesses it would rely upon at
trial. The reason for this nondisclosure is simple: the Superior Court Criminal
Rules of Discovery, like the federal counterpart upon which it is patterned, contains no provision for the pretrial discovery of government witnesses.2 As a result, criminal defendants and their lawyers often go to trial without any concrete
knowledge of the specifics of the government's case. This lack of knowledge
starkly contrasts with the quantum of information available to litigants under
modern civil procedure discovery rules. 3 After considering this contrast, two federal district court judges participated with a co-author writing that:
[i]t is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts virtually unrestricted
discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely limited in
criminal matters. In other words, where money is involved, all parties receive all relevant information from their adversaries upon request; but
where individual liberty is at stake, such information can be either withheld
by the prosecutor or parceled out at a time when it produces the least benefit to the accused.4
Approximately thirty-seven states currently have discovery statutes that are
more progressive than the federal and District of Columbia models. 5 The demonstrable trend is toward greater discovery in criminal cases regarding disclosure of witness information. Why then have statutes like the one found in the
District of Columbia and in the federal courts continued to exist despite the experience of many states with broader discovery statutes? The arguments most often
advanced by opponents to more liberal discovery-usually prosecutors-include
the fear of witness intimidation, an increase in the number of defendants re2

See D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 16. Upon the defendant's request, the government is required

to disclose the defendant's statements, prior criminal record, physical or tangible evidence, results of
scientific tests, and expert witnesses. Id. Regarding pretrial discovery of government witnesses, capital
cases are the exception in the District of Columbia; this exception is, as a practical matter, inconsequential as judges and juries in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia can not impose a death
sentence.
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The Rule provides for the discovery of witnesses, documents, experts,
physical evidence and any other relevant evidence that is not privileged. Id. These Rules also provide
for other discovery mechanisms. See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 27 (providing for depositions); FED. R. Civ.
P. 33 (providing for interrogatories); and FED. R. Cirv. P. 35 (providing for physical and mental
examinations).
4 Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckermann, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions On Criminal Discovery In Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTrrERS L. REv. 1089 (1991).

5 Thirty-seven states that arguably have more progressive discovery statutes are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix infra.
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jecting plea offers and exercising their right to a trial, and the time and expense of
offering greater mechanisms for discovery.
The current restrictions on criminal discovery prove costly not only to those
accused in criminal matters, but also to the efficiency of the criminal justice system. The absence of more comprehensive discovery statutes almost certainly
handicaps criminal defendants in assessing whether to exercise their right to proceed to trial, and in preparing for trial.
This article will review the development of discovery in general and the reasons for the limitations that remain at the federal level and, to a lesser extent, in
some jurisdictions like the District of Columbia. Of course, some interesting
questions emerge in the discussion. Are the reasons advanced for discovery restrictions still valid given the general trend toward greater discovery and the experience of states like Florida, New Hampshire and New Jersey where it is not
uncommon for defense lawyers both to learn the identity of government witnesses and to depose those witnesses much like in civil trials? Do efficient administration of justice and fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system
support or even compel greater discovery in criminal trials? To avoid the "anomaly" between federal civil and criminal discovery, should greater discovery be the
next substantive change to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? Should the
government be required to disclose the identities of witnesses along with the witnesses' prior statements? Would it be fair or even appropriate, if such changes to
the rule did not permit a prosecutor to seek a protective order in response to a
genuine concern regarding the safety or harassment of witnesses? Should other
mechanisms for the exchange of information be put in place? These questions
prompt systematic change, but the attitudes held by the litigants themselves must
also change-at least in the discovery phase-to encourage the greater exchange
of information, efficiency and fairness to all concerned.6
I. THE HISTORY

OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

Discovery, in the context of criminal proceedings, emphasizes the right of the
defense to obtain access to evidence necessary to prepare its own case.7 Discov6

See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NomR

DstE

L. REv. 403, 409 (1992) (suggesting in part that lawyers shift their focus from the adversarial contest
to the discovery of truth).
[I]n endeavoring to moderate the extreme contentiousness of our lawyers and their desire to
win at any cost, we should concentrate our efforts on changing those structural aspects of our
adversary system that encourage and enable lawyers to frustrate truth-determining objectives

in the pursuit of victory rather than pursuing reform primarily through modifying the ethical
rules governing lawyer conduct. By reducing adversary excesses in our criminal trials, we will

speed up the trial process and focus it more sharply on the central character of the trial-the
accused-and on the most important issue-guilt or innocence.
Id.
7

BLAcK'S LAw DICnONARY 466 (6th ed. 1991).
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ery in criminal proceedings has only recently broadened to become reciprocal,
entitling both the government and the defense to information to help them prepare for trial.8
The concept of discovery, as now applied in both civil and criminal cases, began in English courts. 9 At that time, discovery was much less formal and effective than it is today. 10 Traditionally, written pleadings were used as the sole
means to prepare for trial." The objective of this endeavor was to narrow the
case to a single triable issue of fact." The opposing party in turn was expected to
deny every allegation in the opponent's pleadings that would be controverted at
trial. 13 Similar to our current system of interrogatories, every fact not denied by
the opposing party in the pleadings was deemed admitted. 4
The obvious inadequacies of this discovery system led to changes in the way
information was exchanged prior to trial. This traditional discovery system allowed parties to plead false and vague allegations and conceal their true positions. 15 "The mistake of the common law system of procedure in the final
analysis was that written pleadings were supposed to do what they were inherently incapable of doing,"' 6 that is, to furnish both parties with sufficient information to adequately prepare them for trial.
In an attempt to solve the inadequacies of traditional discovery, courts and
lawmakers created more complicated and technical rules for obtaining pre-trial
discovery.' 7 For example English Courts of Chancery used a bill in equity to
promote disclosure of relevant information prior to trial.' The bill in equity con8

See Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 228

(1964) (comparing the restrictions of the federal model and the extensions of discovery in the thenpilot state of California and other jurisdictions).
Perhaps the experience in California and other states will lead to widespread acceptance [of
more expansive discovery] in the United States. [W]e may be on the way to abandoning our
preoccupation with surprise tactics just as we have substantially abandoned the technicalities
of pleading that in their time were also overvalued.... There is more tensile strength in tile
adversary system and a deal more nobility in the profession when adversaries foster procedures that set them free from trick and device and enable them to meet in grand encounter
on the issues.
Id. at 250 (citing Robert L. Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rpv. 293

(1960)) (discussing several state developments indicating a trend permitting more liberal discovery in
criminal proceedings including California, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Washington).
9 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing RAOLAND,
DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 13-16 (1932)).
10 See id.
11 RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1 (1932).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 2.
16 RAGLAND, supra note 11, at 5.
17 Id.

18 Id. at 6.
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tained all relevant facts and circumstances in the case, including questions addressed to the defendant, but without constructive admission for failure to deny
these questions. 19 The bill in equity was intended to disclose all of the evidence
of the case rather than to reduce the controversy to such a form as would make a
trial with witnesses practicable. 20 American lawmakers found this traditional discovery system to be inadequate. Legislators and members of the bar began to
realize that change was necessary. "[T]he draftsmen of New York's Code of Procedure [were some of the first to] recognize the importance of a better a system
of discovery...
The creation and evolution of discovery rules in civil cases preceded the creation of discovery rules in criminal cases.2 2 Formal discovery did not exist in
criminal cases until the adoption of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1946.24 Prior to Rule 16, defense attorneys struggled, often unsuccessfully, to apply civil discovery rules in criminal proceedings3 5
Today, the same English courts have fairly liberal criminal discovery rules. 26
For example, at a preliminary hearing in England, the government is required to
disclose all relevant information that it intends to use at trial. 27 However, courts
in this country use the preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause
exists to hold an accused for trial. 28 Therefore, the preliminary hearing is really
19 Id.
20 Id at 7.
21 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 515.
22 See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth In Judicial
Trials, 66 COLuM. L. Rnv. 223 (1966). "Fundamental changes in our society and modifications in

judicial procedure have created an atmosphere-far different from that of the era when the rules
were developed-particularly conducive to revision." Id.
23 Informal discovery, or discovery where the government voluntarily turns over documents or
information, has long been a part of criminal trials. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, WASH. U. LQ. 279, 282 (1963) (suggesting that for some
time there has been at least a willingness from prosecutors to disclose on a day-to-day basis some of
their files to defense counsel whom they trust; prosecutors are hopeful that disclosure may encourage
a plea and promote judicial economy).
24 See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 1092 (citing F. MtiLt. R. DAwso., G. Dix, &
R. PARNAs, C npmNAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, 750, 755 (3d ed. 1986)).
25 See eg., United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932) (refusing defendant's request
for the court to require the district attorney to turn over for inspection by defense counsel and possible use on cross-examination certain written statements made by government witnesses prior to trial).
"To allow an opposing party to use such statements merely for exploratory purposes in the hope that
he may find some contradiction in the witness' testimony is a doctrine with which the %%riterof this
opinion has little sympathy." Id.at 76.
26 See generally Brennan, supra note 23.
27 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 112 (1958).
28 See United States v. Davis, 330 A.2d 751, 753 & n.2 (D.C. 1975) (citing to D.C. SuPEu. CT.
Ciu. R. 5(c)(1) which included the relevant provision: -The purpose of a preliminary examination is
not for discovery.").
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not an opportunity
to confront witnesses and determine the strength of the gov29
ernment's case.
While it took years to develop Rule 16, efforts to refine the process of criminal
discovery continue to tiis very day. "[The] early version of Rule 16 conferred
only limited disclosure duties.",30 Subsequent amendments were made to Rule
16, and the American Bar Association has continued to propose additional modifications to the rule. The most significant changes were in 1966 when the scope of
pre-trial discovery was expanded.31 In 1974, the rules changed to make discovery
broader and more reciprocal.3 2 In 1983, the rules changed again regarding expert
witnesses and discovery of their testimony. 33 The evolution of modem criminal
discovery is due in large part to a movement towards more liberal discovery initiated by Justices Brennan and Traynor.3 4

Besides the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, there have been other
changes in American criminal jurisprudence that have helped initiate discovery.
For example, case law such as Brady v. Maryland,3 5 and statutes like the Jencks
Act,3 6 have, at least in theory, been helpful to defendants. "Some discovery rights
have developed as a matter of constitutional mandate, but most have their basis
in legislation or court rule.",37 It is no wonder that our system of discovery has
29 See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure,69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1183 (1960) (arguing that because the preliminary hearing's function is
to determine probable cause, it requires only minimal disclosure and, therefore, provides only minimal opportunity for the defense to discover the government's case).
30 See MILLER, supra note 24, at 750.
31 Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 MILLER, supra note 24, at 750. See Brennan, supra note 23 (suggesting that pretrial discovery
ought to be a right equally shared in the criminal justice system.). "Apart from the constitutional
overtones of denial of equal protection involved in such a practice, I think we must all agree that the
opportunity for discovery on equal terms should either be the right of all accused, or the right of
none." Id. at 282. See also Traynor, supra note 8.
35 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or innocence or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
36 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1988). The Jenks Act states in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the
possession of the United States which was made by a Government Witness or prospective
Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery,
or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court
shall on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the
subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be
delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
Id.
37 MILLER, supra note 24, at 750.
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evolved to meet the demands of litigators and of the courts. This evolution seems
particularly necessary in criminal cases where the government is investing resources into prosecuting cases, the judiciary is investing resources in having those
cases tried, and, most importantly, a defendant's liberty is at stake.
Substantial debate remains about whether to make criminal discovery rules as
comprehensive as the civil rules. Many states, such as Florida,3S now favor liberal
discovery rules in criminal cases, while others, such as the District of Columbia,
have favored discovery rules that are far less liberal regarding the nature and
scope of information that must be exchanged. 39 Justice Brennan has rhetorically
summarized the issue in this debate as follows: "Should we extend to criminal
prosecutions the civil pre-trial discovery techniques which force both sides of a
civil law suit to put all cards on the table before trial, and tend to reduce the
chance that surprise or maneuver, rather than truth, may determine the outcome
of the trial?" 4°
Further change to criminal discovery rules seems inevitable, but strong opposition to more liberal criminal discovery rules exists. 4' For example, in Judge
Learned Hand's view, more liberal discovery for the defendant was not necessary
because he believed the defendant already enjoyed a significant advantage."a
Judge Hand believed that because of the high burden the government must meet,
the amount of evidence they must assemble to meet that burden, and the defendant's privileges that may shield them from disclosing their defense, broader discovery for the defendant was neither necessary nor fair.43
38 See FLA. R. CRmi. P. 3.220(h) (Supp. 1998) (providing in relevant part that upon reasonable
written notice and a good faith effort to accommodate both parties, "[a]t any time after the filing of
the charging document any party may take the deposition upon oral examination of any person au-

thorized by this rule.").
39 See supra note 5; Appendix infra.
40 Brennan, supra note 23, at 279.
41 See generally William Bradford Middlekauff, What PractitionersSay About Broad Criminal
Discovery Practice:More just- or just more dangerous?. 9 A.B.A. SEC. Can.t. Jus-r. Cm.a. JusT. 14
(Spring 1994).
42 See United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
[Tihe defendants, recognizing that it is difficult to make a case for quashal by the scraps of
evidence accessible, move for inspection of the grand jury's minutes. I am no more disposed

to grant it than I was in 1909. . . . Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, [the defendant] need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense.
Id.

43 Id. That opinion was written prior to the notice-of-alibi rules that require a defendant to give
the government a list of witness that the defense plans to call at trial to provide an alibi defense. Id.
See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding notice-of-alibi rules constitutional as applied
to the defendant); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (holding that notice-of-alibi rules must be
reciprocal reasoning that because the defendant must turn over a list of alibi witnesses, the government in turn must disclose a list of rebuttal alibi witnesses it intends to call at trial.).
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What changes to discovery rules, if any, will be forthcoming is difficult to
judge. Fairness seemingly would dictate, however, completely reciprocal discovery, like that required in notice-of-alibi rules." The goal of all discovery devices
should be to increase information made available to all parties, thereby enhancing the fairness and efficiency of the criminal justice system. 45 However, with an
ever growing crime rate and increased concerns that the criminal justice system is
"soft on criminals," it is hard to imagine changes in criminal discovery rules that
would make discovery for the defendant easier. Thus, the question remains: what
should we do with the current rules of discovery? Perhaps this question can be
more easily answered after a closer look at the current state of criminal discovery.

H. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Pretrial discovery remains the primary fact gathering tool in litigation. Professor Thomas Mauet noted that, "[i]n today's litigation environment, the discovery

stage is where most of the battles are fought and where the war is largely won or
lost."' 46 Discovery in the criminal context is largely governed by rule. While
court rulings and legislative action have resulted in some change of the discovery
landscape, the principle tool for discovery remains the information made available under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 is principally designed to "minimize the undesirable effects of surprise at trial and to
otherwise contribute to the fair and efficient administration of justice. '47 Rule
16, unlike discovery in civil cases, provides for only a modest disclosure of pretrial information. 48 The rule provides for discovery in five areas: the oral or recorded statements of the defendant, defendant's prior record, documents and
tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests and expert witnesses. 49 The
44 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. and Advisory Committee's note. "The court said that it was not
holding that a notice-of-alibi requirement was valid under conditions where the defendant does not
enjoy 'reciprocal discovery against the State."' Id. (quoting Wardius, 412 U.S. at 82 n.l1.).
45
46

Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474.
THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 165 (2d ed. 1993).

47

Smith v. United States, 491 A.2d 1144, 1147 (D.C. 1985).

48 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(calling for more expansive discovery
and permitting parties to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action .... ).
49 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. The discovery provision on experts was recently amended to provide for greater informational exchange and now requires the government upon request of the defendant to disclose "a written summary of the expert testimony that the government intends to use
during its case in chief [and the] 'expert witnesses' opinion, the bases and the reasons therefor, and
the witnesses' qualifications." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(e). The rule also contains a reciprocal provision
and requires the same type of disclosure by the defense once the government complies with its obligation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(e) and (2)(b).
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defendant's request for this information triggers the government's obligation to
provide discoverable material in the government's care, custody or control.50
While Rule 16 is very clear about the type of information that must be disclosed by the government, it is equally clear about the type of information that
need not be disclosed. The plain language of section (a)(2) of the rule provides
that "... statements made by government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses" are not discoverable. 5' In addition, there is no provision in Rule 16
for the mandatory disclosure of the identity of witnesses the government may call
in its case-in-chief. While the rule is extremely limited in what prosecutors must
provide, there is nothing in the rule that prohibits the voluntary disclosure of
information beyond that required by the rule.
In many jurisdictions the practice of informal discovery leads to a far greater
exchange of pretrial information than is required by any provision of the discovery rules. 2 One commentator, citing a study conducted by the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section Rules of Procedure and Evidence Commit53
tee, concluded that informal discovery was wvidespread in the federal system.
Of the United States Attorneys who responded to the survey, twenty-four percent indicated that Rule 16 was strictly followed. 54 Sixty-six percent of the
United States Attorneys noted that they disclosed witness names and statements,
55
and forty-two percent said that they followed an open file discovery policy.
While informal discovery apparently enhances the ability of the parties to obtain information, make plea decisions, and generally prepare for trial, this type of
discovery will always depend on such factors as the personal relationships of the
litigants, the policy limitations of a given prosecutor's office, as well as other factors wholly unrelated to the merits of the case. Moreover, informal discovery
provides no mechanism for judicial regulation. As a result, informal discovery is
50 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Rule 16 is silent on the issue of when the discovery right of a defendant
vests. See also Clifford v. United States, 532 A.2d 628, 634 n.5 19 (D.C. 1987). Although the general
practice may be for the government to provide formal discovery in felony case only after indictment,
the rule does not inhibit "the court's inherent potential discovery powers." l. See also, United States

v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973).
51 FED. R. CRun.

P. 16. But see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988) (supplying the lone exception to the

non-disclosure rule by requiring disclosure of prior statements at the conclusion of the witness' direct
testimony).
52

Some jurisdictions like the District of Columbia require informal discovery as a part of the

pretrial process. See D.C SuPmR. CT. Cmi. R.16-1 (providing in relevant part: -It shall ba the duty of
every defense counsel... to consult with the prosecutor assigned to the case in order to seek informal
discovery. .. ").
53 See generally Middlekauff, supra note 41.
54 See Jencks Act Amendments. Hearings on H.&. 4007 Before the Subconmn. on Criminal Jus-

tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1985) (considering whether to
require pretrial disclosure to the defense of Government witnesses' names and testimony unless the
court finds that disclosure endangers witnesses' safety or the integrity of the judicial process).

55 1I
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a limited, albeit helpful, tool in the discovery arena and can not replace the benefits achieved by rules requiring a greater exchange of information in criminal
cases.

Discovery, either by statute or court rule, supplemented by the informal exchange of information, often leaves criminal defendants speculating until the trial
about both the identity of the witnesses to be called by the government and the
information that would be provided by those witnesses. The absence of disclosure by the government of the identity of the witnesses and their statements
leaves a defendant and the lawyer at the time of trial woefully ill prepared to
mount a defense. As one author noted:
Without the opportunity to investigate the background and character of a
government witness, the defense... may be denied the chance to refute the
government's assessment of the credibility of its witnesses. This is an example of how a discovery
restriction can curtail the adversarial system rather
56
than preserve it.
This is the quandary that most criminal defendants must confront when all discovery under Rule 16 is complete.
Curiously enough, prosecutors have available to them at least one discovery
device specifically designed to assist the government in preparing for trial. 57 The
alibi notice rule found in Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides the government with the ability to obtain the names and addresses of
any witnesses the defense would call in support of an alibi.5 8 There is, of course,
a reciprocal provision requiring disclosure of names and addresses of government
witnesses who would establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense.5 9 Such provisions have been in existence since at least 1927.60
Many states now have similar provisions founded on the "important purpose of
preventing unfair surprise to the prosecution and obviating the need for any continuance which may arise when one side introduces unexpected testimony at
56 See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 1095 (citing United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813,
820 (8- Cir.)(1972)).
57 This is not to ignore the reciprocal provisions of FrD. R. CRIM. P. 16 passed in 1966, that
require the defendant to disclose evidence after making a Rule 16 request to which the government
complies.
58 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. The Rule states in relevant part:
Upon written demand of the prosecutor.., the defendant shall serve... upon the prosecutor
a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer the defense of alibi. Such notice by the
defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been
at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom
the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.
Id.
59 See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).

60 See United States v. Williams, 399 U.S. 78, 81 n.10 (1970) (citing Epstein, Advance Notice of
Alibi, 55 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S.29, 32 (1964)).
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trial." 6 The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Florida's alibi
rule in Williams v. Florida.62 Upholding the validity of the Florida rule, the
Supreme Court stated:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker
game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards
until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as "due
process" is concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to 63investigate certain facts crucial to
the determination of guilt or innocence.
One of the primary concerns suggested for the existence of the rule was the
ease with which an alibi can be fabricated. In Williams, the government subpoenaed the defendant's alibi witness to the prosecutor's office on the day of trial.'
There, the prosecutor deposed a witness and used that deposition at trial to expose inconsistencies in the witness' testimony. 6s In addition, the government was
able to locate and present rebuttal testimony indicating that the witness was
somewhere other than her apartment with the defendant and his wife at the time
of the robbery.66 Many years after Williams, the Supreme Court, in Taylor v.
61 See Clark v. United States, 396 A.2d 997 (D.C. 1979). See also Robert P. Mosteler. Discov.
ery Against the Defense: Tdting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L REv. 1567 (1986); Sarokin &
Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 1098 & n.30 (suggesting that the alibi notice provision provided the
government with an additional discovery advantage).
The advantage enjoyed by the government in criminal proceeding, due to its vastly superior
investigative resources, is further heighten by Rule 12.1 and its state counterparts. -Reciprocal discovery" in the context of the notice-of-alibi is anything but evenhanded; the defendant
gives away much more, practically speaking, that he or she receives in return. We are not
denouncing all defense disclosure in principle, but such prosecutorial discovery provisions...
must be accompanied by a far freer discovery for the defense, if fairness at trial is to be given
more than lip service.... Another related problem confronting the defendant is the apparent
inability of the defense to reserve the right to adopt a particular trial strategy. For example.
defense counsel may not know at the pretrial stage whether a certain alibi defense will be
appropriate or helpful. This is especially so in cases ... where the charges include conspiracy
and are vague with respect to the dates and locations of the alleged commission of crimes.
The defense must nonetheless furnish the government with all information covered by the
notice-of-alibi rule if it plans to establish an alibi. But there is no corresponding duty for the
government ever to disclose its trial strategy other than the obvious strategy to attempt to
refute the defendant's alibi. Apparently, the identities of some of the government's witnesses
can remain undisclosed indefinitely-for the prosecution is free to claim that their testimony
might not be necessary for its case.
Id. Compare Wiliams, Advance Notice of the Defense 1959 CpuM. L REv. 548 and Comment. Pretrial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE LJ. 626 (1951).
62 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
63 Id. at 82.
64 Id. at 81.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Illinois,67 again noted, in a different but no less compelling context, that "[d]is-

covery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predi68
cated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony."
Furthermore, "[b]y aiding effective trial preparation, discovery helps develop a
full account of the relevant facts, helps detect and expose attempts to falsify evidence, and prevents factors such as69surprise from influencing the outcome at the
expense of the merits of the case.",
The need to prepare for trial, avoid surprise, and to detect and expose attempts to present false or mistaken testimony is no less important to a criminal
defendant than to the government in the alibi context. The very same reasoning
is often used by civil litigants, whether plaintiff or defendant. Of course, in the
civil context, the discovery rules seek to avoid these very legitimate concerns by
permitting discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." 7 °
The present discovery rules assist litigants with trial strategy and preparation,
and the rules most certainly promote greater efficiency in criminal justice administration. However, the current disclosure limitations create a vast potential for
uninformed decisionmaking by defendants. Accordingly, attorneys represent
criminal defendants with less information than they would otherwise have for a
civil trial, and they risk being caught by government surprise and may, therefore,
request costly delays to recover. The absence of greater disclosure undoubtedly
has an unfortunate impact on the notions of fairness held by litigants and nonlitigants alike.
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on
full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.7 1
Many states have addressed these concerns by providing greater pretrial discovery to criminal defendants. 72 These states have not ignored the very real issues that relate to broader discovery. Instead, these states have sought to
accommodate the legitimate but competing concerns of criminal litigants in an
effort to provide greater information for trial decisions, attorney preparation and
67 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
68

Id. at 411-12.

69 Id. at 425 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 26. See supra note 48.
71 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (emphasis added).
72 See infra Appendix.
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ultimately to ensure that verdicts are not founded on "a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts." 73 The need for the federal system to evolve with the

modem trend is no less apparent today than in 1994 when the American Bar
Association Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure approved sweeping amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 74 The
state experience significantly evidences the practical benefits that criminal litigants can secure from greater discovery. As Justice Brennan once indicated, "the
quest for better justice is a ceaseless quest, [and that] the single constant for our
profession is the need for continuous examination and reexamination of our
75
premises as to what law should do to achieve better justice.

m. THE,DEBATE

OVER ExPANDED DISCOVERY

"Few issues raise more sharply the basic ideological clash between opposed
theories than the issue of broader pretrial discovery." 76 As Justice Brennan emphasized twenty-six years after his initial lecture at the Washington University
School of Law that the "[lI]aw's evolution is never done, and for every improvement made there is another reform that is overdue." 77 Approximately thirty-six
states have adopted some form of discovery requiring the government to disclose
the identity or statements of witnesses the government expects to call at trial or
who appeared before the grand jury.78 During the same period, there have been
no additional restraints placed on criminal discovery.
The arguments for and against greater pretrial discovery have generally remained unchanged over the years. Those in support of greater pretrial discovery
suggest that defendants will have a fuller and fairer opportunity to assess the
evidence against them. 9 With this opportunity, a defendant with the advice and
experience of counsel could, at a much earlier stage, concretely assess the
strength of the government's case and make an informed decision regarding a
guilty plea or trial. The government would be forced, again at a much earlier
stage, to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of its case and, as a result, make more appropriate and better informed plea offers. As a practitioner,
one will frequently observe defendants who become less inclined to accept initial
plea offers as a result of the government's withholding discoverable material consistent with Rule 16. Furthermore, lacking witness statements and identities and
73

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.

74 See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R Crami. P. 16.
75 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture. The Criminal Prosecution.
Sporting Event or Quest For Truth? A Progress Report. 68 WASH. U. LO. 1,2 (1990)[hereinafter
Progress Report].
76 Brennan, supra note 23, at 282.
77 ProgressReport, supra note 75, at 2.
78 See supra note 5; Appendix infra.
79 See eg., Brennan, supra note 23; Middlekauff supra note 41.
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other fruits of liberalized discovery, a defendant with counsel has no real idea
about either the quality or quantity of the government's evidence. Accordingly,
negotiations often drag on until very close to trial. The expense of this practice
must be enormous. In any event, many defendants proceed to trial in cases that
should have been settled with plea agreements. Greater pretrial disclosure would
produce more plea agreements that are fair; avoid the time and expense of prolonged, independent, defense investigation; limit the amount of pretrial litigation
that may be used to simply supplement the discovery made unavailable by the
rule; and save the time and expense of unnecessary trials.
Greater discovery also contributes to judicial economy resulting in less delay
and fewer continuances 8 0 More extensive discovery sharpens the issues to be
adjudicated at trial, and when permitted at an earlier stage of the judicial process,
it allows attorneys to prepare for witnesses and to avoid surprise. Consistent with
the rationale supporting the alibi notice provision of Rule 12.1, more complete
government disclosure ensures that there will be fewer defense lawyers claiming
surprise and ensures correspondingly, a diminished need for continuances before
and during trial.8 '
Many commentators argue that more extensive pretrial discovery is desirable
simply because it permits "participants in the criminal action [to] have the same
broad access to information as is accorded parties in most civil suits." 8 2 As Justice Brennan asserted: "I submit that we must rethink our opposition to allowing
the accused criminal discovery, certainly if we are to continue to maintain that
our system of criminal justice, if not favoring the accused, at least keeps the scales
evenly balanced in his contest with the state."8 3 More extensive discovery has
the added benefit of providing greater assurance that the accused will receive
effective assistance of counsel consistent with the Sixth Amendment. Justice
Brennan spoke strongly also on the difficulty facing attorneys in attempting to
represent criminal defendants with very limited discovery:
[T]he court-appointed lawyer in a criminal case usually comes to the case
late, after the state has gathered its evidence against the accused. Assigned
counsel therefore must do what he can within the limited time usually allowed before trial, often long after the trail has grown cold. He must deal
with an accused whose obvious interest in self-justification complicates his
lawyer's task of finding the true facts. Even if he can learn the names of the
witnesses against his client, those witnesses have already talked to the
80 See Sarokin & Zuckermann, supra note 4, at 1090. Disclosing witness statements under the
Jencks Act, counsel for the defendant and the state are almost always forced to request a recess to
digest and incorporate the information made available at the conclusion of direct examination. Id.
81 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (imposing on the government a duty to disclose information and
witnesses).

82 See Middlekauff, supra note 41, at 16.
83 Brennan, supra note 23, at 285.
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state's investigators and more frequently than not have been warned not to
talk with anyone representing the accused.84
Despite what may appear to be compelling reasons for greater criminal discovery, the opposition to expanded criminal discovery has remained consistent almost since the adoption of Rule 16.85 One argument advanced in support of the
current limitations on pretrial discovery suggests that expanded discovery would
be a one-way street.86 The "state would have no right whatsoever to demand an
inspection of any of [the accused's] documents or take his deposition, or to submit interrogatories to [the accused]" given the constitutional protections against
self-incrimination. 87 In addition, the defendant would be capable of "introduc[ing] any sort of unforeseeable evidence he desires in his own defense. To
allow [the accused] to discover the prosecutor's whole case against [the accused]
would be to make the prosecutor's task almost insurmountable. "88
Others observe that expanded discovery "will lead not to honest fact finding,
but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of evidence." 89 A related
concern suggests "that the criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all
of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves to avoid testifying altogether." 90
Concern about witness intimidation is a primary concern raised by opponents to
expanded discovery. The potential chilling effect that could result from the government disclosing one of its own witnesses prior to trial is perhaps an even
greater concern to opponents of expanded discovery. The belief is that witnesses
would simply not cooperate with law enforcement if the witnesses knew that the
defendant would have knowledge of their names, addresses or statements.
Despite this constant debate, many states have adopted discovery provisions
that are more expansive than those found in the federal system and local jurisdictions like the District of Columbia. 91 While opposition remains strong at the
federal level, the clear trend across the country is to provide greater discovery in
84 Id at 286 (citing David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49
CAL. L. Rev. 56 (1961); Robert L Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State CrininalCases, 12 STAN. L
REv. 293 (1960)).

85 See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (NJ. 1953). The court agreed that liberal discovery is
designed to minimize opportunities for falsification of evidence but cautioned that, while liberal dis-

covery is essential in the effort to search for truth, liberal fact finding procedures were not to be used
blindly because liberal discovery often leads to pejured testimony. Id.The court opined that criminal
defendants who are aware of the prosecution's entire case against defendants %ill often procure per-

jured testimony in order to set up a false defense. ld.
86

Id.

87 Id. at 885.
88 1&
89 Id. at 884 (citing State v. Rhodes, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (Ohio 1910); Commonwealth v. Mead, 12
Gray 167, 170 (Mass. 1858)).
90 Tune 98 A.2d at 884 (citing People v. Di Caro. 292 N.Y.S. 252, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1936)).
91 See supra note 5; Appendix infra.
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criminal cases consistent with that permitted in civil litigation. These modern
provisions often provide witness information.
IV.

THE MODERN TREND

California was perhaps the first of the states to allow broad discovery to criminal defendants. 92 Since at least the 1960's, prosecutors in California have been
required to disclose witness information and statements to the defense in advance
of trial. 93 Other states soon followed and enacted similar provisions. 94 The
American Bar Association (ABA) passed sweeping standards for pretrial discovery in 1970.95 Consistent with the state trend, the ABA provisions also include
the disclosure of witness information and statements for those witnesses who the
government expects will testify at trial. 96 Despite the ABA's standing committee's vote not to forward the proposal for further consideration, the move toward
more expansive criminal discovery had gained momentum. 97 Notwithstanding
the sometimes strong Congressional opposition to the ABA provisions, thirty92 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
93 See id. §§ 1054.1(a), 1954.2 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
94 In 1968, Florida enacted FLA. R. CruM. P. 3.220 to afford the defense the ability to take
depositions. In 1973, New Jersey enacted NJ. R. CRIM. PRACrICE 3:13-3 to require disclosure of
witness identity and statements.
95 See A.B.A. STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1 at 52 (Approved Draft, 1970).
96 See 48 F.R.D. 547, 587 (1970); United States v. Holmes, 343 A.2d 272,275 (D.C. 1975) (quoting ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1 at 52 (Approved Draft,
1970)). The ABA Standards § 2.1 provided in pertinent part:
"2.1 Prosecutor's Obligations.
(a) [T]he prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defense counsel the following information within
his possession or control:
(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses
at the hearing or trial, together with their relevant written or recorded statements ..."
ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.2 (Approved Draft, 1970)). The
standards endorse broad discovery in criminal cases generally because greater discovery "provide[s]
adequate information for informed pleas, expedite[s] trials, minimize[s] surprise, afford[s] opportunity
for effective cross-examination, and meet[s] the requirements of due process." Holmes, 343 A.2d at
275 n. 9 (quoting ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.2 (Approved

Draft, 1970)).
Two strong reasons are given for this recommendation. The first is that it is clearly in the
interest of fairness that the defense be able to prepare to cross-examine and test the credibility of the government's witnesses. The second, which the Advisory Committee finds even
more compelling, is that a broad discovery policy (including the disclosure of witness lists) is
vital to the effective administration of our system of criminal justice. Disclosure assures that
issues which affect the validity of the proceedings and which should be disposed of pretrial
are brought to the attention of the defense and are dealt with in a timely manner. In addition,
disclosure of the prosecution's evidence "facilitates the obtaining of guilty pleas" which has
"positive values for the criminal process" and is more efficient as well.
Id.
97 See generally supra note 94.
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seven states now provide for some form
of discovery that requires disclosing
98
either the trial or grand jury witnesses.
The concerns regarding witness intimidation, perjury, and one-way discovery
have been refuted by the experience of the states. For example, prosecutors in
New Jersey must disclose the "names and addresses of any persons whom the
prosecuting attorney knows to have relevant evidence" as well as the "statements" of those witnesses. 99 Florida defense attorneys, in addition to receiving
witness information, have the ability to depose government witnesses. 1"0 In Arizona, the discovery statute requires disclosing witness names and addresses' 01 in
addition to permitting depositions deposing any "person's testimony [that] is material to the case or necessary [to] adequately prepare for a defense or investigate
an offense."' 2 The experience of using depositions in criminal cases led the
Florida Supreme Court to commission a study in 1988. The Commission on
Criminal Discovery concluded that discovery in criminal cases was cost-effective
and should be retained. 0 3 Moreover, if depositions were eliminated, the net financial cost to the state of the criminal justice system would increase.1 4 The
report also recognized that there were infrequent, although serious, instances of
abuse.' 0 5 Public defenders and prosecutors agreed that there was some intimidation of witnesses, but it was very limited and did not result from the discovery
process. 10 6 The study further concluded that trials tend to0 be
shorter because the
7
litigants are more familiar with the evidence and issues.1
Partly as a result of the state experience with broad discovery, the ABA Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure in 1994 approved amendments to Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 0 s The proposed amendments
required the government to disclose the names and statements of government
witnesses in non-capital cases no later than seven days before the trial.' 0 9 The
98 See supra note 5; Appendix infra.

99 See NJ. L CPaM. PRAcrcIC 3:13-3(c)(7)-(8).
100 See FLA. R. CRm. P. 3.220. Only six states permit criminal depositions as a matter of right.
See ARm. R CRim. P. 15.3; FLA. R. Cimi. P. 3.220; N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 517.13 (1974 & Supp.
1996); N.D. R. Cium. P. 15; VT. R. Cmiui. P. 15.
101 See ARz. R. CRim. P. 15.1(a)(1).

102 ARi7z R. CRmi. P. 153(a)(2).
103 See Middlekauff, supra note 41, at 56 (citing Report of the Florida Supreme Court's Commission on CriminalDiscovery (1989)).

104 Id.
105 Id.

106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See FED. R. Cium. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(Proposed Official Draft 1994).
109 Id. The amended provision required the disclosure of the following:

(F) Names and Statements of Witnesses. At the defendant's request in a non.capital case,
the government, no later than seven days before trial, must disclose to the defendant:
(1) the names of the witnesses the government intends to call during its case in chief;
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proposed amendments also contained a reciprocal provision that required the defense to disclose the same type of information at the request of the government,
but only after government compliance." 0 These proposed provisions would
bring the federal system into line with the great majority of the states. The Advisory Committee recognized that broader discovery would promote greater efficiency, promote more plea agreements and permit litigants to better prepare for
trial."'
Protective orders would address the concern regarding witness intimidation or
harassment if discovery were to include witness information." 2 As the Advisory
Committee Note to the proposed amendments indicated:
The Committee considered several approaches to discovery of witness
names and statements. In the end, it adopted a middle ground between
complete disclosure and the existing Rule 16. The amendment requires the
government to provide pretrial disclosure of the names of witnesses and
their statements unless the attorney for the government submits, ex parte
and under seal, to the trial court written reasons, based upon the facts relating to the individual case, why some or all of this information cannot safely
be disclosed. The amendment adopts the approach of presumptive disclosure that is already used in a significant number of United States Attorneys
offices. While the amendment recognizes the importance of discovery in all
cases, it protects witnesses and information when the government has a
good faith basis for believing their disclosure will pose a threat to the safety
13
of a person or will lead to an obstruction of justice."
(2) any statements, as defined in Rule 26.2(f), made by the witnesses.
Id.
110 Id.
111 See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (indicating the balancing of concerns
about witness safety with the benefits of expanded discovery).
The Committee shares the concern for safety of witnesses and third persons and the danger
of obstruction of justice. But it is also concerned with the practical hardships defendants face
in attempting to prepare for trial without adequate discovery, as well as the burden placed on
the court resources and on jurors by unnecessary trial delay.
Id.
112 Rule 16 has always contained a provision for protective orders which provides the court
with the discretion to issue orders designed to regulate the manner in which discovery is conducted.
Unfortunately, it is a little-used provision. The use of protective orders in civil litigation is enormous.
As Justice Brennan has repeatedly stated:
Where dangers do exist, and abuses are threatened, not denial of discovery but appropriate
safeguards to prevent such dangers and abuses, should be our effort. We found out that the
civil discovery procedures could be abused, and fashioned safeguards against them. The
court-made rules protecting the attorney's work product and enforcing privileges against disclosures of confidential or secret information are examples.
Brennan, supra note 23, at 294.
113 See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. RULE CRIM. P. 16. See also Sarokin & Zuckerman,
supra note 4, at 1090. "The burden should be placed on the government to demonstrate that risks of
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The Committee recognized the risk to safety sometimes experienced by witnesses. 114 Where the possibility of danger is established, trial judges should have
the discretion to fashion appropriate remedies to avoid or minimize intimidation
or harassment. The Florida experience suggests that witness intimidation can be
minimized by disclosing information to the attorney without disclosing it to the
accused. Ethical obligations would prevent lawyers from purposely or intentionally disclosing such information to the accused.' 1 5 Even with disclosure limited
in this fashion, the defense is still in a better position to make informed plea
decisions, investigate and prepare for witnesses, avoid surprise and avoid the
need for costly continuances.
The argument that defendants will use greater discovery to promote perjury,
false defenses or suppression of evidence is equally unpersuasive. Quoting Professor Wigmore, Justice Brennan indicated that:
The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is
no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair
means of clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and
with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of6 the criminal law ... to allow the
accused to produce any witnesses at all."
The greater availability of pretrial information promotes the search for the truth
by arming both sides with the information necessary to test the credibility of witnesses before and during trial. After all, a primary purposes of discovery is to
assist litigants in preparation for trial where truth is the primary goal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Expanded criminal discovery is anything but a one-way street. This is evident
after considering, for example, alibi notice rules that provide the government
with extensive opportunities to discover the defense case all in the name of
preventing unfair surprise and delay. The proposed amendments to Rule 16, like
most state provisions, would require the government to reciprocate and disclose
to the defense important pretrial information. Consistent with the protections
afforded criminal defendants under the Fifth Amendment, reciprocal discovery
provides the government with the very same type of information regarding witnesses that should now be available to the defense.
tampering, intimidation, or perjury exist. Absent such a showing, early and complete disclosure
should be required. If,on the other hand, the government can make such a showing, a narrowlydrawn restriction on discovery may be imposed." Id (citing Brennan, supra note 23, at 294).

114 See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CmiU.P. 16.
115 Addressing this concern, Justice Brennan opined: -Whatever justification there may be for
the assumption that the desperate accused will try anything to escape his fate, the notion that his
lawyer can't wait to conspire with him to that end hardly comports with the foundation of trust and
ethics which underlies our professional honor system." Brennan, supra note 23, at 291-92.
116 Brennan, supra note 23, at 291 (quoting 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940)).
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APPENDIX

STATE CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULES
Disclosure to the Accused
Addresses/
Names of Locations of Statements
Witnesses Witnesses of Witnesses

Ability to
Depose
Witnesses

Alabama
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1
Alaska
ALAsKA STAT. §12.45.050 (1996).

Arizona
/

/

/

/

/117

/

/

/

ARI. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 & 3

Arkansas
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1
California
CAL- STAT. §1054.1 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
Colorado

/

COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§54-86(b) (West

1994 & Supp. 1997)

Delaware
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM.

District of Columbia
D.C.

SUPER. CT.

Florida
FLA. R.

CRIM.

1 19

/118

R. 16

CRiM. R. 16

P. 3.220

/

/

/

/

Georgia
GA. CODE ANN.
12 0

§ 17-16-3 (1997).

Guam
8 GUAM CODE ANN. §70.10
Hawaii
HAW. R. PENAL P. 16

/

/
/

/

/

/

/

/

Idaho
IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16

/

/

/

Illinois
ILL. ST. CT. R. 412

/

/

/

/

/

/

/121

Indiana
IND. R. CRIM. P. 7

117 Statement of co-defendant when co-defendant is a witness against defendant
118 Statement of a witness before a grand jury when defendant is a corporation, partnership,
association or labor union
119 United States capital city.
120 United States Territories
121 HAW. R. PENAL P.15 (granting court discretion to order deposition of a witness upon
motion of a party "whenever due to special circumstancees of the case it is in the interest of
justice .. ").
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Appendix (continued)
Addressesf
Names of Locations of Statements
of Witnesses
Witnesses
Witnesses

Ability to
Depose
Witnesses

Iowa
ANN. § 813.2, Rule 13 (1994
& Supp. 1996).
Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 22-3213 (1973 & Supp.
1997).
Kentucky
Ky. RuLEs OF CRni. P. 7.24
Louisiana
723 LA. CODE CriM. P. tit. 23 (1981 &
Supp. 1997).
Maine
MER. CRu. P. 16
Maryland
MD. ST. CRIv R. 4-253
Massachusetts
M.Ass. ANN. LAWs ch. 218 § 26A (1993 &
Supp. 1997).
Michigan
Mici. R. Cpjm. P. 6.201
Minnesota
49 Mwn. R- CrM. P. 9.01
12 2
Mississippi
MISS. STAT. § 99-27-45
Missouri
Mo. PC-um. P. 25
Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322 (1979).
Nebraska
NEB. REV. ST. § 29-1912 -19-17 (1995).
Nevada
NEv. R.Ev. STAT. § 174.235 (1997).
New Hampshire
N.H. SurEa-. CT. R. 99
New Jersey
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-10 (West 1987
& Supp. 1997).
New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-504 (Michie 1978).
New York
N.Y. R. CiUm. P. § 240.20

V

IOWA CODE

122

Information not available.

/

/
1/
/

V

O
f
/

/

,

,

V

/

/

/

/
V

/

V

/

/

/

O
f

/

V
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Appendix (continued)
Addresses/
Names of Locations of Statements
Witnesses
Witnesses of Witnesses

North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT.
(1996).
North Dakota

ANN. ART.

Ability to
Depose
Witnesses

48 § 15A-903

N.D. R. CRiM. P. 16

Ohio
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16

/

/

/

/

V

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2002 (1986 &

Supp. 1995).

Oregon
O.R. REv.

STAT.

§ 135.815 (1989 & Supp.

1997).

Pennsylvania
PA. R. CRIM. P. 3111_
Puerto Rico
P.R. R. CRIM. P. 95

Rhode Island
R.I. SUPER. R. CRIM. P. 16
South Carolina
S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5
South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-13-6 (1988 &
Supp. 1997)
Tennessee
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16
Texas
TEx. STAT. ANN. ART. 39.02 (1979 &
Supp. 1998).
Utah
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16
Vermont
VT. R. CRIM. P. 16
124

Virgin Islands
FED. R. CrM. P. 16
Virginia
VA. S. CT. R. 3A:11

Washington
WASH. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. CRR.

4.7

/

123 See also PA. R. CIuM. P. § 305 (discretionary disclosure by the court of witnesses' names,
addresses and statements).
124 United States Territories
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Appendix (continued)
Addressesf
Ability to
Depose
Names of Locations of Statements
of Witnesses Witnesses
Witnesses
Witnesses
West Virginia
W. VA. R- CR. P. 16
Wisconsin
Wise. STAT.

ANN. § 971.23 (1985 & Supp.

1997).

Wyoming
Wyo. R. Ciuss. P. 16

/

/

